Saudi Arabia and the war in Sa'ada
Saudi Arabia and the war in Sa'ada<br>

Saudi Arabia and the war in Sa'ada

11 November 2009
Most Arab countries have issued statements of solidarity with the Saudi government (and not with the Yemen) in the war against the 'aggressor' Huthis - including the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. These statements of are of little significance at present because the crisis confronting Saudi Arabia is much deeper than its Arab allies - including the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council, who flew them to Doha yesterday morning to discuss the crisis and its implications - realize.

We do not exaggerate if we say that the ongoing war between the Houthis and Yemeni forces is embroiling in Saudi Arabia in a much more serious crisis than its role in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the summer of 1990 and makes one remember the war that broke out after the revolution of Abdullah Sallal in 1962 which toppled the Governing Imami in Sanaa, and opened the floodgates for the entry of Egyptian forces in a confrontation with the Saudi government.

What distinguishes this war is that it is first and foremost a sectarian war, a political conflict second and a social clash third. It has the potential to rapidly turn into a regional conflict as evidenced by yesterday's statement by Manouchehr Mottaki, Iranian Foreign Minister in which he said 'We strongly recomment that neighboring countries should not interfere in the internal affairs of Yemen', a strong warning to the Government of Saudi Arabia which sets the stage for regional and sectarian polarization which may change the shape and political map of the region and threaten its stability.

We have several reasons for saying that this might be the most dangerous crisis the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has faced since its founding eighty years ago:

First: the Saudi leadership has long adopted a regional strategy aimed at maintaining the balance of power by becoming involved in conflicts outside its own borders. It supported Saddam Hussein against the Khomeini revolution in the 1980 - 1988 Iraq-Iran war, for example - an alliance which ended up weakening both nations - only to facilitate the US liberation of Kuwait from occupation by the same Saddam Hussein just two years later having become worried about Iraq's growing regional power.

Now, however, Saudi Arabia faces a growing threat from within, posed by its Shi'a minority and more than one million native Yemenis, many of whom support the [Shiite] Huthis.

Second: the 1500 kilometre Saudi-Yemeni border and the 400m Red Sea coast of Yemen from Aden to Saada are poorly guarded by the Yemeni security forces which facilitates the smuggling of weapons and people. Meanwhile Eritrea is said to have become a base for smuggling arms to the Huthis and itself occupied the disputed Hanish Islands fourteen years ago with some of its poorly equipped troops landing in fishing boats and easily outwitting and out-fighting the weak Yemeni navy.

Third: the ruling family has managed to stabilize Saudi Arabia's internal security but a long war of attrition in the South would certainly weaken the regime. Furthermore the increased presence of al-Qa'ida in Yemen, where it has established a new arm (al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula) and a new HQ, is an additional threat to Saudi security and attacks within the Kingdom against major targets may resume at the level they were at five years ago when the organization was strong inside Saudi Arabia itself.

Fourth : Ironically, the Saudi regime fanned the flames of the 1994 Yemeni civil war which created the chaotic scenario and instability which has made of Yemen another failed state in the region. Failed states are al-Qa'ida's favourite environment.

Fifth: Regional politics have changed dramatically since 2003. Saddam Hussein is no longer around to address Iranian interference in the war with the Huthis, and the US is fully engaged in its bloody and futile wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nor is the Gulf Cooperation Council unified behind Saudi Arabia in its war and the whole Gulf region is rife with squabbles and disputes.

We conclude by saying that Saudi Arabia has taken a big risk with its interference and, having stirred up a hornet's nest, risks getting fatally stung, despite the great superiority in the balance of power in their favor. We have to remember that the mighty US military power toppled Saddam and the Taliban, but is still reeling as a result of the insurgencies that erupted in the aftermath.

If it is true that Iran is supporting the Houthi insurgency with money and arms, as appears to be the case, this means that we have a new insurgency triangle - consisting of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and the Houthis in Saada. The common denominator of this triangle is Iranian missiles and hostility to America, Israel and the moderate Arab countries.

The moderate Arab states in turn might hope to revive Arab-American hegemony and appease Israel by adopting the option of peace under their terms. The destruction of Iraq and Yemen, and the deprivation in many poor Arab countries have all led to these disturbing developments that may see the whole Arab region disintegrating into failed states.

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